

# MOBILIZATION OF WORDS TO THE BATTLE FIELD: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF ARABIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON WAR ON TERROR

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## ABSTRACT:

*Language is not an objective and innocent tool to share information with people. Language can also be used for subtler purposes of exercising power, expressing attitudes and emotions, and for controlling, commanding, and persuading people. Well-spoken words can motivate people to go to war and sacrifice their lives. Words can change people's attitude and thinking. Words of a leader are the most influential lethal weapon for war and most effective inspirer for peace. History has recorded innumerable occasions from Alexander's speeches to his soldiers to the speeches of JF Kennedy and FD Roosevelt during the Second World War when political leaders mobilized words to the battlefield to fight a war. The most recent examples are the speeches of various countries on War on Terror in the wake of rising threat of the Islamic State. In this paper I am going to present an analysis of select Arabic speeches on War on Terror in order to understand how various discursive strategies have been successfully used to persuade the audience to support their War on Terror.*

*This paper highlights the discursive construction of persuasive discourse against terror outfits in the speech of Haider Al Ibadi, the prominent Iraqi leader. Ruth Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) has been used as a model for analyzing these speeches. The analysis shows how these speakers have been successful in persuading the Iraqis and the international community to join and support the War on Terror through the strategy of argumentation and the topoi of history and emotion in more particular.*

**Key words:** Political discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis, Argumentation, Persuasion

## INTRODUCTION

In theory and origin, the word 'persuade' is borrowed, through Old French, from the Latin term 'persuadere', which is a blend of the prefix 'per' denoting 'completion' (throughout, or thoroughly), plus the base 'suadere' meaning to 'advise' or 'urge' (Sandell:1977:78). In Old English, the term persuade did not mean to 'convince', but merely to attempt to convince (Brembeck & Howell, 1976: 24). Persuasion, as a concept is notoriously elusive to define. Its

meaning ranges between negative and positive associations alike. In a negative understanding, Mulholland (1994: 47) states, that persuasion is the "misuse of power", the same could be said of the "manipulation of other's minds", of the "manufacturing of consent", or of "artificial activity." This negative meaning is recognisable today in the contemporary scepticism towards politicians for empty words and misleading arguments, as illustrated (in bold) in the following extract:

Mr. Baker: That is the trouble of the Labour Party: one has to distinguish between its rhetoric and reality when it comes to law and order. [...], Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersly) said that he wanted to see more policemen on the beat, yet when he was a member of the last Labour Cabinet he cut the number of policemen and left the police force under strength. (Part of the House of Commons Debate, 23 June 1992, quoted from Charteris-Black, 2014:4).

Persuasion is an interactive process of communication that depends on arguments and reasons. The success of persuasive communication depends upon the degree of correspondence between the speaker's intention and listener's perception (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1992:22). In other words, the communication is successful only to that degree to which the intended purpose(s) of the sender of the message is served. This would mean that persuasion is a cooperative act in which speakers try to give enough and relevant information so that the listeners can deduce the meaning. Correspondingly, Grice (1975) identifies four conversational maxims: quantity, quality, relevance and manner for effective and persuasive communication. The maxim of quantity of the communicators should be as informative as required. They should neither give less information nor give more information. They should give only that much information which is required by the listener to understand their message and intention. The second maxim is the maxim of quality, which states that the communicators should say what they believe to be true. They should not state what they don't believe to be true. The third maxim is the maxim of relevance. This maxim states that the communicators should say only what is relevant. The fourth maxim is the maxim of manner. This maxim recommends brief, orderly and unambiguous expression.

Politically, persuasion is not accidental, nor is it a coercive social activity. Persuasion is inherently a pre-planning communication activity by the persuader and the free choice acceptability of the persuadee (Perloff, 2000: 10). Persuasion is an unconscious activity, whereby, a persuader moves his intentions and

thoughts to shape, reinforce or change the attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviours of a persuadee through the medium of communication (O'Keefe, 2002; Charteris-Black, 2006; Dainton & Zelle, 2011). In contrast to persuasion, coercion involves a conscious activity that occurs (a) when a threat to at least one person's goals is observed, and (b) when the source and degree of this threat are both sufficiently important to warrant the expenditure of effort involved in persuasion. Like persuasion, coercion is one of the strategic functions of political discourse which is covertly associated with power (see Chilton, 2004). Coercion is the intentional use of power in order to influence the way others act to maintain one's interests and goals (Chilton, 2004: 47; Hart, 2010: 63). It is not an entirely discursive activity, it rather depends on the speakers' "resource and power" (Chilton, 2004: 45). However, the physical power therefore, would never have persuaded others (Cicero, 1954, cited in Richards, 2008:4)

#### PERSUASION, LANGUAGE AND POLITICS

This section explains the interrelated relationship among language, politics and persuasion. Persuasion is an essential element of political discourse, as political orators use various rhetorical and discursive strategies to persuade their audiences in order to modify their opinions and decisions. They create political ideologies and exercise power over their people through the persuasive use of language. In politics, language is not always an innocent and objective medium of sharing meaning and information. Indeed, it is the main tool to perform political actions and advance political agenda. Chilton and Schaffner (2003: 3) maintain, "the doing of politics is predominantly constituted in language". It can be used for constructing ideologies, exercising power and persuading people. Those who know and use these powers of language become powerful. Although the use of language in all its genres is capable of controlling and persuading people, public speech has proved its potential for controlling and persuading people more than any other genre (Mohan, 2013: 14). For various socio-political purposes, politicians use language for persuasive ends, as every

political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced by language (Schaffner, 1997:1).

However, Holtgraves & Lasky (1999:197) believe that linguistic power has no impact upon the persuasion process. Of course, language is not the only means of persuasion, but it is one major tool in the achievement of it. People may be persuaded for example, by bribery, by the influence of family or social relations, even though they may not correctly take place unless they are delivered with persuasive language (Mohan, 2013:34). This is because language has many influential powers. It can be employed to achieve social as well as personal affects. Language can be utilized to affect, to suit, to construct, to attack or defend, to maintain or damage, and so on, of people's ideas, beliefs, ideologies, values, relations, and assumptions; any of which could be persuasively applied for some intended purposes. Mulholland (1994: xviii) conceptualizes the persuasive function of language by defining language itself. He defines language "a means of interpreting the world, and a set of methods by which to influence their own and other's perceptions of the world, [...], and to manage the interactions they have with other." For instance, our ideas are constructed into texts, which represent our attitudes and emotions to the world through words, grammar, and, to such extra –language factors like voice qualities and body language. Language is not a mere representation of some aspect of reality; language constitutes reality itself (Edelman 1971 cited in Shapiro, 1984: 6). In politics, language is not an innocent and objective medium of transferring information but, it is a tool of power, of dominance, of control, and of persuasion. Some practitioners of language like politicians, advocates and the orators achieve great power with the help of language as a tool of power. These practitioners of language know what to say, when to say it, whom to say it to, and most importantly, how to say it (Mohan, 2013: 37). They use language strategically to catch the attention of, and convince an audience. This strategic use of language is provided by the art of rhetoric, the art of public speeches in which rhetors look for what is possibly persuasive in every given case.

## ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

To prove its functionality, the speech should persuade its audience, as any political activity is designed for persuasion more than information (Miller 1991:390; Dedaić 2006: 700). Of course, argumentation is a major feature of justification specially of going to war, as "warfare demands organization and mobilization, as well as the circulation of beliefs about the enemy and justifications for need to kill and die". (Michael Billig 2003: ix), and argumentation serves the justification of validity claims either by truth or normative rules (Kopperschmidt, 2000: 59). To be more logical and persuasive, claims require support by various argumentative patterns or topoi in order to transfer them to certain conclusion(s). In persuasive discourse, topos is "the building blocks on which actors must draw to persuade or convince the listener" (Forchtner 2014:25). Hence, this part of the analysis focuses on examining those topoi the orator uses to connect claims and move them to certain conclusion(s) in order to convince the audience about specific proposals in accordance with specific perspectives and agendas. The analysis and discussion of argumentation strategies the speaker employed in the speech found the following topoi.

- **The topoi of danger & threat**

Depending on the conditional sentence *If there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them*. The speaker tries to prove that DAESH is a common enemy threatening international security and therefore, its defeat is a common goal, the goal that requires collective regional and international efforts. In so doing, the speaker depends on two grammatical categories in order to depict the other/DAESH as a global threat and danger. The first one is the adjective "radical," which expresses the ideology of DAESH. In particular, this depiction is a clear re-contextualisation of invoking historical events (see Richardson & Work 2009:46). Specifically, Al-Abadi echoes Bush's words, when the latter described the aim of al-Qaeda as "*imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere*" (see Appendix 1, line 48). In light of that, Al-Abadi explicitly placed DAESH and Al-Qaeda within the same group. Therefore, they are terrorists, a threat and should be avoided.

The second category is the noun “*barbarism*.” Socially, ‘*barbarism*’ has a negative historical connotation. It connotes the culture of an uncivilized or rude nature. Here, the speaker tries to persuade the audience through the topos of history – the rhetoric of judging (Frochtner<sup>1</sup> 2014:26). It rests on a double exclusion of the (out-groups) radicals and barbarisms, as well as the other/DAESH. In line with this, the speaker links as data the past wrongdoing committed by barbarians and radicals, and forms the conclusion that similar actions could be proposed today by the other (DAESH) if the speaker’s proposal is not considered. The following table (8.5) represents the premises the speaker perhaps depends on to conclude that DAESH is a global threat and danger:

Premise 1: DAESH does not differentiate between people in committing atrocities, beheading and mass murder (L13-14),

Premise 2: DAESH enslaves women and children from all ethnic and religious groups, regardless of their affiliations and geographic boundaries (L15-16),

Premise 3: DAESH is recruiting and training fighters from the West besides those who are being recruited from other areas (L17-18),

Premise 4: [DAESH is] highly skilled terrorists will return to the communities from which they came to commit murder and cause destruction (L19-20),

Conclusion: DAESH is a common threat and its defeat is a common goal.

Table (8.5). Topos of threat and danger.

Through this table (8.5), the speaker tries to generalise the threat of DAESH not only geographically, in the Middle East, but also ethnically (premise 2). The orator is attempting to prove that the threat of terrorists/ DAESH is not only threatening Muslims but all ethnic and religious affiliations. Not much later, the threat of that small group, ‘entity’ is expanded to

include, “*all who refuse to accept the radical ideas and the practices of barbarism anywhere*” (L11-12). Above all, particularly in the adverb “anywhere,” Al-Abadi addresses two audiences - national and international, in turn, it serves the crisis - the threat of DAESH. Importantly, Al-Abadi’s rhetorical work in the above example, in which he expands the risk of DAESH to include all civilized, democratic people, allowed him to expand the in-group category. Aristotelian, it is a persuasive method (pathos-that incites fear emotions) to engage the world in a political and military conflict, Al-Abadi explains the nature of the threat to the quotidian. It can be paraphrased into ‘terrorism is not only contained within the borders of the Middle East, but terrorism cannot be located on a map.’ The imprecision of terror borders serves the speaker to frame and legitimize the necessity of collective regional and international efforts against an ideologically defined enemy. Without this emotional appeal to the live audience (the participants) ‘the feeling of being unsafe,’ it is hard for the speaker to build a case for military and economic support.

In turning to the emotion of fear, seemingly, in this discourse, emotions - fear, in particular, are the building blocks of constituting the topos of threat and danger. It serves for dual functions. In terms of persuasion, it is a parallel response model (Cameron 2009:310) that the speaker applies to persuade his audience, such as their emotional responses and desires to eliminate the threat and danger that occur upon exposure to a fear appeal (Witt 1992, 1994). For Aristotle (1982: 3), Pathos/emotion denotes a salient, yet usually, potential premise(s) on which persuasive argument(s) rely (premises 1, 2, 3 and 5). On the other hand, the emotion of fear is also an implicit premise on which the speaker legitimizes individual claims. More specifically, he establishes the discourse of a hypothetical future as a strategy to legitimate his proposal “*our presence today shows that we have a common goal to defeat DAESH which requires collective regional and international efforts,*” If not the premise (4) will be the future, fearful scenario.

<sup>1</sup> He conceptualizes and exemplifies four types of the topos of history. They are the rhetoric of judging, rhetoric of failing, rhetoric of penitence

and rhetoric of judge-penitence. (Frochtner 2014: 20).

However, the speaker does not forget to mention himself in the sense of power and authority.

- **The topos of power and authority**

In this discourse, the speaker practices two sources of power to weigh his proposition(s), which in turn make it more legitimate and persuasive. These are personal and impersonal powers. At the beginning of the speech, the speaker thanks the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for hosting this conference in their headquarters (L3-4). Then, he introduces the attendees as the foreign ministers from countries around the world (L9-10). By focusing on the Avenue (NATO's headquarter) and the status of the participants (foreign ministers), the speaker strengthens his impersonal authority through the authority of NATO, as well as the power of the participant's position and status.

In line with the personal authority, the speaker implicitly acquires the power of the Iraqi people as he presents himself "On behalf of the Iraqi people" (L12-13). The persuasive forces of this presentation are twofold: first, by introducing himself as such, he introduces himself as part of a large group - Iraqi people (in-group). Second, he implicitly introduces himself as the democratically and constitutionally elected representative of Iraq. This presentation is a rhetorical figure called 'metonymy,' which aims at the conciseness of a concept by a single word or words that are closely related to that concept. In the forthcoming example Al-Abadi, then, boosts this idea, when he presents himself and the team he chairs as the guard, who protects and secures these democratic gains. As such, he attracts the attention and intimacy of those attendees, who believe in democracy and freedom.

في العراق اليوم، تبذل شتى الجهود لحماية المكتسبات الديمقراطية، سواء من خلال اعادة تشكيل حكومتنا ومصالحه مجتمعنا، او من خلال مقاومة داعش واعادة علاقاتنا مع الدول المجاورة لنا

Today in Iraq, various efforts are being made to protect the democratic gains, whether through reshaping our government and our society's reconciliation or through resisting DAESH and restoring our relations with our neighbouring countries (L98-101).

To convince the audience for more support, Al-Abadi mitigates that power when he argues, "the challenges we face cannot be confronted by only one country (L101-102), see also L 73). This is even though the meaning of mitigation, which the example involves, is still potent to the speaker or the country he represents. It presents DAESH as a burden which no one can challenge alone. Nonetheless, the Iraqis did. Persuasively, the benefits of that mitigation are twofold: first, it motivates the attendees' sense of fear (persuasion by fear). Second, it is an interdiscursive device; as it eases the link to the other topic or sub-topics, specifically the discourse of need. 'The discourse of need' will be dealt with in more detail later. It is possible to see discourse through a cluster of multi argumentative strategies at once. They are the topoi of burden, finance, humanitarianism and the dis/advantage topoi. Contextually, the discourse of need can be outlined into six discourse topics. They are: 1) supporting military operations, 2) increasing the capacity of building, and training; 3) stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; 4) cutting off ISIL/DAESH's access to financing and funding; 5) addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises; and 6) delegitimization ISIL/DAESH's ideology. Inasmuch, Al-Abadi re-contextualizes the speech of Al-Maliki<sup>2</sup> during the conference of anti-terrorism, which was held in Baghdad between March 12-13, 2014.

- **The topos of burden**

The words such as "governmental reforms," "national reconciliation," "economic and social rebuilding" (L26-27) indicate that Al-Abadi has a policy preference, which is burdened by terrorism or DAESH

<sup>2</sup> For more about the speech of Al-Maliki see: [www.al-monitor.com/pulse/.../iraq-baghdad-anti-terror-conference.htm](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/.../iraq-baghdad-anti-terror-conference.htm)

specifically. He depicts terrorism or DAESH as a burden on progress not only for the Iraqis or the Middle East, but also for the world. Therefore, collective regional and international efforts are legitimized/required to diminish it. In so doing, AL-Abadi goes with the conditional statement of the topos of burden, if an institution is burdened by a specific problem, then one should act to diminish it (Kucukali, 2014:103).

Through the speech, the speaker asserts that Iraq and Iraqis are the front lines in fighting terrorism (L22-24). That may justify or naturalize Al-Abadi's demand that *"we will need the broad support of our brothers and partners in this aspect"* (L73-74). Simply, because, *"when we [Iraq] fight DAESH, we are not only fighting for the people of Iraq, but we are fighting for all the peoples of the world"* (L75-77). By doing that, (underlined), the speaker not only justifies why the world should support him but also legitimizes, sustains and motivates the supporters [participants] to offer more. This legitimation strategy is called moral evaluation (Van Leeuwen 2007:97). The evaluation whether this or that action is moral or not is linked to specific discourses of moral values – a sociocultural view. In the case of Arabic discourse and Iraqi in particular (underlined), it is a moral value and one should reward it. Hence, the speaker uses 'we need' 13 times distributed over four discourse topics: military, ideology, finance and humanitarian aids and support. To make it more persuasive, the discourse of "we need" is based on a problem-solution formulation. As such, Al-Abadi introduces the matter of confronting terrorism as a challenge (problem) that is only solved by a chain of 'needs. For instance, military wise:

**PROBLEM/ BECAUSE** "our security forces lack the complete training and arming" (L73).

**SOLUTION/ WE NEED** 1) "broad support of our brothers and partners in this aspect (L 73-74) and 2) "air force backing, training, arming and building the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces" (L104-105). 3) the support of neighboring countries and allies in the struggle to put an end to the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq. (L106-107). This is because "Iraq should not be a training ground for terrorists coming from and returning to every spot where problems exist

on earth" (L108-109). This example is a clear recontextualization of Al-Maliki's words "I will not allow Iraq to become a launch pad for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations." (See Appendix 3, lines 154-156).

In the same structure, the speaker presents the need to fight corrupted ideologies and stop uncontrolled financial transactions as part of the War on Terror, as respectively illustrated in the following examples.

**PROBLEM/BECAUSE:** "[the] extremist violence is inspired by the corrupted ideologies" (L113-114).

**SOLUTION:** "we need from the neighbouring countries in the Middle East and North Africa to combat DAESH's concepts of ideologies.

However, the speaker does not clarify the nature of these corrupted ideologies and how it relates to terrorism or DAESH in particular. He does not hesitate to identify the source of these ideologies: The Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile the orator asks for financial support and supporters in the fight, as it will limit their expansion:

**PROBLEM/BECAUSE:** "DAESH not only attracts fighters from all over the world but also receives its funding from many countries around the world as well" (L109-110).

**SOLUTION:** "we need from the international community, including its financial institutions, to freeze the funding of DAESH and direct a call to stop the unrestricted movement of money and ammunition to those international terrorists (L111-113). In line with the discourse of 'we need' Al-Abadi sees the humanitarian aids as part of fighting terrorism, as it contributes to recruiting refugees who have been displaced because of terrorism in other waves of acts of extremist violence (L115-118). Therefore, he motivates the international community to increase their humanitarian support to address the humanitarian crisis caused by DAESH.

- **The topos of finance**

*"the civil war in Syria caused the displacement of approximately two million people, and now they are staying within our borders"* (L118-120).

By the above quotation, the speaker equates the refugees of Syria as a burden on the budget of Iraq and its financial policies. The *topos of numbers* (underlined) is important in this section, where economic damage is proved in terms of the figure of those refugees (underlined), especially, when “*they are staying within our borders.*” The key element of this financial burden is that “*We have allocated a huge amount of money from our budget for these refugees*” (L128-129). However, this does not simply mitigate the speaker’s personal, moral or religious responsibilities about the Syrians refugees. Nevertheless, it is a rhetorical strategy the speaker uses in order to share responsibility with other neighbouring countries and partners to address the humanitarian crisis caused by terrorism/DAESH. Meanwhile, this example also comes as support for the negative representation of Other-DAESH. Argumentatively, this endeavour is based on the following conditional statement: if sufficient numbers are given, a specific action should be performed. Contextually, this action can be realized in the following part of the discourse of ‘we need’: “we need the support of the entire international community to endure and heal the wounds of the victims of violence” (L130-131).

One more example of the *topos of finance* the speaker employs to convince the audience of a reconstruction fund to reconstruct the Iraqi liberated areas from the control of DAESH can be seen in Table 8.6 below. It is worth saying that DAESH bombs most of the public buildings, houses and roads of the areas it has controlled, such as Anbar, Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit and so forth. Therefore, Al-Abadi urges the international community to increase their financial support as a successful policy to encourage the residents of these liberated areas to return to their home (L122-125).

Premise 1: [DAESH] displaces approximately two million people and now they are staying within our borders (L119-120),

Premise 4: we have allocated a huge amount of money from our budget for these refugees (L128-129)

Premise 2: [The] liberated areas from the control of DAESH need an urgent rebuilding campaign (L122-123),

Premise 3: [DAESH] ceases Iraqi’s oil Northern exports (L128).

Conclusion: DAESH is a burden to the Iraqi financial progress policy.

Table (8.6). The *topos of finance*.

This argumentation strategy (*finance*) also benefits from the *topos of definition*. The word ‘reconstruction’ explicitly, defines the speaker and his administration policy, the policy of rebuilding campaigns’. Meanwhile, it implicitly defines the negative policy, the policy of deconstruction, the other/ DAESH adopted. By rhetorically dehumanizing the other/ DAESH, Al-Abadi shapes his listeners’ psychological preparedness for funds engagements, supporting that with the following statement:

ابنتها الاخوات والاخوة؛ لن نتمكن من هزيمة الارهابيين الدوليين الحاقدين الذين يعتاشون على الفشل الا بعد اعادة بناء عراق آمن ومستقر في شرق اوسط آمن ومستقر، وبما ان داعش يمثل عدوا مشتركا لنا ينبغي ان تكون هزيمته هي مسعانا المشترك ايضا.

**BROTHER AND SISTER, we will not be able to defeat the malicious international terrorists who are living on failure, only after rebuilding a stable and secure Iraq in the Middle East that is safe and stable, since **DAESH represents our common enemy, therefore, defeating DAESH is our common endeavour too** (L131-133).**

Through the precise selection of words (underlined), and the appeal to an assumed set of universal values (**bold**) the speaker solicits support from his audiences. These words in turn “serve to appeal to external sources of legitimization” (Graham, et al., 2004:199). Of particular note is the rhetorical device ‘we,’ which it is inclusive in nature, as it includes the speaker and the addressees, the conference’s attendees. Moreover, another rhetorical movement of legitimation/persuasion can be seen in this above excerpt. Indeed, the instance of temporal

proximization (future – present). In particular, Al-Abadi reports that what will happen in the future (underlined) are the exhortations of what must happen now (*italic*). Meanwhile, he tends to present a grandiose vision of the distal future, indeed in the instance of spatial proximization (Cap, 2006, 2008, and 2010). The stability and security of Iraq are represented as the stability and security of the entire world.

The implication of that representation is that in order to secure positive values (security, peace, freedom, prosperity, faith) for all the people in the distal future, the world community (the attendees) must presently engage in supporting Iraq and its battle against terrorism. Again, the covert implication is that we must take immediate action to stop terrorism, i.e., DAESH. By unpacking the implicit and explicit meanings of the above utterance, it is easy to see that supporting Iraq is the only way to prevent a dreadful future, as the speaker suggests that this future will come about if we (the speaker and the attendees) fail to build a stable and secure Iraq in the Middle East.

This conclusion also comes close to the topos of advantage, indicating an advantage - if there are positive consequences from a decision, the decision should be accepted. Intertextually, this conclusion is linked through synonymy to the content meaning of Al-Maliki's. As Thibault (1991) suggests, intertextuality does not necessitate a text to cite or allude to other text(s), or to share any keywords of another text to be considered intertextual. Indeed, it needs only share, abstract semantic patterns or formations (Lemke 1995), which may be "thought of as generic meanings that underline the specific wordings in a given text." (Odo 2011:290). Based on Odo's suggestion, the above example is intertextual, as it shares the thematic formations of the forthcoming example of Al-Maliki's words. (see appendix 3, lines 33 to 35).

أن مصير بلدنا وبلدان العالم مرتبط ببعضه إذا سمح للديمقراطية ان  
تفشل في العراق وللا رهاب أن ينتصر فلن نحقق النصر ولن نحققه أبداً  
في الحرب عليه في المناطق الأخرى في العالم.

The fate of our country and the world's countries is tied to each other. If democracy is allowed to fail in Iraq and terror permitted to triumph, then the war on terror will never be won elsewhere (Al-Maliki 2006 (L33-35)

## CONCLUSION

The study examined the conference speech of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Dr. Haider Al-Abadi. The speech was delivered via the first Ministerial-level plenary session on 3 December 2014, at the avenue of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The reason for holding the conference is to counter the threat and danger of terrorism in the Middle East, especially the terrorist effects of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or DAESH. The most perennial aim of the speech was to motivate the international community to the danger of terrorism (ISIS) not only to the Middle East, but to the entire world, therefore, the Iraqi War on Terror should be supported, because "we[ Iraq] are not only fighting for the people of Iraq, but we are fighting for all the peoples of the world" (L75-77). Hence, terrorism (ISIS) is "our common enemy therefore defeating DAESH is our common endeavor too" (L134). That way justified the discourse of 'we need', that the speaker constructed whereby Al-Abadi appealed to the audience of the world community for more military and financial support, justifying these requirements through a cluster of multi-argumentative strategies of burden, finance, humanitarianism and the dis/advantage topoi.

In terms of the discursive analysis, the chapter focused on the discursive strategies in accordance with the DHA central strategy of argumentation and how the speaker employed it as persuasive project. In argumentation analysis, Al-Abadi did not hesitate to use various argumentative schemes to mobilize the world community to the fact that DAESH does not only threaten the countries and peoples of the Middle East, but it also threatens all who refuse its radical ideas and the acts of barbarism anywhere. To move this claim to conclusion, the topoi of threat and danger, the emotion of fear in particular, and the topos of burden are employed. In this part, the speaker does not only identify DAESH as a physical (security or



military) threat but also an ideological menace inspired by the ideology of beheadings and mass murder and the enslavement of women and children. The speaker, hence introduced terrorism an enemy without clear borders that may extend beyond the boundaries of the Middle East, if his suggested plans are not considered.

Overall, the speaker didn't hesitate to use the possible persuasive discursive means to gain the utmost support for his suggested proposals. He employed the DHA central discursive strategies effectively to gain unconditional support. In this case, the attendees' repercussions, are a logical parameter one can depend on to evaluate the persuasiveness/success of the speaker or the speech. Based on that fact, Al-Abadi had succeeded in convincing the audiences. They (the live audience), as the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry stated through a press conference<sup>3</sup>, pledged their full support for the government and the people of Iraq in their efforts to fight terrorism and help, assist refugees and displaced individuals, and enable them to return to their homes.

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